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Abstract Since the 1990’s, the debate concerning the
ethical, legal and societal aspects of ‘neuro-enhance-
ment’ has evolved into a massive discourse, both in
the public realm and in the academic arena. This ethical
debate, however, tends to repeat the same sets of argu-
ments over and over again. Normative disagreements
between transhumanists and bioconservatives on inva-
sive or radical brain stimulators, and uncertainties re-
garding the use and effectivity of nootropic pharmaceu-
ticals dominate the field. Building on the results of an
extensive European project on responsible research and
innovation in neuro-enhancement (NERRI), we observe
and encourage that the debate is now entering a new
and, as we will argue, more realistic and societally
relevant stage. This new stage concerns those technolo-
gies that enter the market as ostensibly harmless con-
trivances that consumers may use for self-care or enter-
tainment. We use the examples and arguments of par-
ticipants in NERRI debates to describe three case studies
of such purportedly innocent ‘toys’. Based upon this
empirical material, we argue that these ‘soft’ enhance-
ment gadgets are situated somewhere in the boundary
zone between the internal and the external, between the
intimate and the intrusive, between the familiar and the
unfamiliar, between the friendly and the scary and, in
Foucauldian terms, between technologies of the self and
technologies of control. Therefore, we describe their
physiognomy with the help of a term borrowed from
Jacques Lacan, namely as Bextimate^ technologies.
Keywords Soft neuro-enhancement . Responsible
research and innovation . Do-it-yourself technologies .
Upstream public engagement . Case study approach
Introduction
Since the 1990’s, the debate concerning the ethical, legal
and societal aspects of ‘neuro-enhancement’ or ‘cogni-
tive enhancement’ (two terms which are often used
interchangeably) has evolved into a massive discourse,
both in the public realm and in the academic arena.
Emerging developments in the neurosciences have
raised the possibility that nootropic pharmaceuticals
and / or devices, usually developed for therapeutic pur-
poses, may increasingly be used to optimise brain pro-
cesses in ‘normal’ people who are not impaired by
mental illness or cognitive disorders [1]. Countless de-
bates and discussions have been organized, numerous
articles have been published and a plethora of opinions
have been expressed concerning this issue. And al-
though specific dimensions of human cognitive perfor-
mance have been highlighted in the course of the debate
– genes, neurons, synapses, neurotransmitters,
Neuroethics
DOI 10.1007/s12152-016-9283-6
J. Brenninkmeijer :H. Zwart
Institute for Science, Innovation & Society, Faculty of Science,
Radboud University, Heyendaalseweg 135, 6525 AJ Nijmegen,
The Netherlands
J. Brenninkmeijer (*)
Theory & History of Psychology, Faculty of Behavioural and
Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Grote Kruisstraat 2/1,
9712 TS Groningen, The Netherlands
e-mail: j.m.brenninkmeijer@rug.nl
behaviour, etc. – the same set of arguments tends to be
raised over and over again. The ethical debate basically
revolves around core themes such as authenticity [2, 3],
autonomy [4–8], safety and effectivity [9, 10]; compet-
itiveness [11–13], and equity [14–16].
From the very beginning, moreover, there have been
two sides in the enhancement debate. Bioconservatives
[e.g. 17, 18] argue against it. Their major concern is that
enhancement technologies will dehumanize human be-
ings. Neuro-enhancement will make people less authen-
tic, andmake society more competitive and less fair. The
so-called transhumanists on the other hand [e.g. 19–22]
argue in favour of human enhancement technologies.
They basically claim that people should be free to decide
for themselves and their children, while becoming post-
or trans-human should not be seen as a degradation, but
rather as an upgrade of human nature and as something
which humans have always been striving for anyway
(for instance by inventing language, the alphabet, nu-
meral systems, the school system, mechanical instru-
ments, vehicles, etc.).
Besides these normative polarisations, there are also
various empirical uncertainties involved. The fact that it
is very unclear how many people actually use nootropic
substances, for instance, is regularly mentioned [23, 24].
Another point of discussion is how effective neuro-
enhancers actually are, or could possibly be [10]. That
is, the relevance or even reality of the problem is some-
times questioned [25, 26]. Moreover, if the issue of
neuro-enhancement is taken seriously, most people are
especially interested in the long-term risks – and since
there are no answers to this as yet, the discussion often
becomes deadlocked. Perhaps because of this, those
people who are either worried or have high expectations
about the future of neuro-enhancement often tend to
exaggerate the debate. There is a tendency to come up
with fairly dramatic (or even fantastic) utopian or dys-
topian scenarios about humans becoming cyborgs or
super-humans, entering a new evolutionary era, while
‘natural’ 1.0 humans will soon become an endangered
species [27, 28].
Building on the results of an extensive European
project on responsible research and innovation in
neuro-enhancement in which we participated (NERRI),
we observed that somewhere in between these two more
‘traditional’ pathways – that is, the ‘bioconservative/
transhumanism debate and the effectivity debate - , a
less predictable debate on ‘soft’ enhancement technolo-
gies seems to unfold as well. We noticed that some
people use (or fantasize about) technologies that are
not very radical but rather (pretend to be) smooth, con-
trollable and user-friendly. In this article, we would like
to emphasize this new tendency and hope to encourage
the debate to enter a new and, as we will argue, more
realistic and societally relevant stage. In our opinion, the
focus of attention should shift from pharmaceuticals
such as Ritalin or Modafinil on the one hand and radical
cyborgisation of humans on the other to a new genera-
tion of optimising devices known as Non-invasive Brain
Stimulation devices or NIBS [29, 30], or as Do-It-
Yourself brain optimisers [31]. Examples of these tech-
nologies are transcranial Direct Current Stimulation
(tDCS), transcranial Alternating Current Stimulation
(tACS), transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), and
transcranial Focused Ultrasound Stimulation (tFUS).
Such brain stimulation technologies are not used for
radical self-transformations, but rather function as gad-
gets that people use to care for themselves or to entertain
themselves. This form of enhancement typically takes
the form of non-invasive, user-friendly wearable de-
vices. Inspired by this new emerging practice, or even
market, of soft (‘smooth’) enhancers, while looking for
ways out of the impasse in the established neuro-
enhancement debate, we decided to use the empirical
material produced in the NERRI project and focus on
this quickly evolving arena of non-invasive neuro-en-
hancement devices.
Most contributions to the academic debate opt for a
conceptual and / or normative analysis, assessing and
clarifying the various arguments pro and con. Insofar as
a more empirical approach is taken, the focus often is on
exploring public attitudes towards enhancement [32] or
on studying the actual views and experiences of, for
instance, student populations [33]. In this paper we will
opt for a case study approach focussing on soft enhance-
ment technologies. Three instances of ‘soft enhance-
ment’ will be analysed. We insist on using the quotation
marks here because, rather than being innocent and
harmless, these neuro-toys are presented and promoted
as such. Whether they really are as innocent and playful
as they may seem, is one of the issues to be addressed.
These gadgets deserve our attention, we will argue,
precisely because they are neither trivial nor overly
dramatic or futuristic. They are already available, ex-
plored and used, at least in an auto-experimental fash-
ion. To arrive at a preliminary assessment of these
technologies, we will build on some of the views and
arguments which emerged in the course of the NERRI
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project, in combination with the available literature. We
will argue that ‘soft’ enhancement gadgets are situated
somewhere in the boundary zone between the internal
and the external, between the intimate and the intrusive,
between the familiar and the unfamiliar, and between the
friendly and the scary. Therefore, we will describe their
physiognomy, their technological profile with the help
of a term borrowed from Jacques Lacan, namely as
Bextimate^ technologies [34, 35]. Extimate technolo-
gies, we argue, are like parasites.1 Without us being
fully aware of it, they infiltrate our social lives, expose
our intimate feelings, and change our ideas of ourselves
and each other. And although this relationship is not
solely parasitic – since we also enjoy using these small
little devices – they come so close to our bodies and
beings, we could consider them as rather intrusive.
Soft Enhancement
NERRI (Neuro-Enhancement: Responsible Research
and Innovation2) was a mobility and mutual learning
project funded by the FP7 Science in Society Initiative
of the European Commission, from 2013 to 2016. The
aim of NERRI was to contribute to the shaping of a
normative framework underpinning the governance of
emerging neuro-enhancement technologies. NERRI
was conducted by a consortium of 18 partner institutions
from 11 European countries.3 Each partner collected and
analysed relevant literature, conducted interviews with
stakeholders, and organized public debates in the form
of Mutual Learning Exercises (MLEs). As explained in
the NERRI reports, MLEs are events that Baim to bring
together various groups of stakeholders (researchers,
users, intermediaries, professionals, students, media,
broader publics) to facilitate a mutual learning process
through mutual exposure of views and experiences,
expectations and concerns^ [36, p.9, see also 37].
Studying the reports, field notes and some tran-
scripts4 of these NERRI events on the one hand clearly
revealed the repetitive deliberative trends which are also
present in the current academic and public debate men-
tioned above, namely on the one hand the trend towards
trivialisation of the debate (‘How many students take
Ritalin before an exam?’; ‘And is it really different from
drinking coffee?’) and on the other hand the trend to-
wards over-dramatization of the debate (‘neuro-en-
hancement techniques will dramatically and irreversible
affect human nature’, i.e. the bioconservatism vs.
transhumanism debate). Indeed, while the trivialisation
trend often stranded in factual uncertainties, the drama-
tization trend often resulted in endorsing or rejecting the
conclusion that we must either save human nature or
accept that we are all becoming cyborgs already. On the
other hand, and as already indicated in the introduction,
a new and (we believe) more interesting area of debate
appeared to open up. This debate emerges around this
new type of technologies which we already referred to
as ‘soft enhancers’ and which purportedly allow users to
manage their mood, sleep and level of arousal via mea-
suring, and subsequently influencing, cortical activity in
specific regions of the brain
In contrast to technologies that have deep irreversible
impacts on neurological health and identity, and which
are therefore exclusively applied in therapeutic settings
[38, 39], there is already an audience and a market for
these ‘softer’ technologies. That is, in contrast to the
more scary neuro-tools that are actually inserted into the
brain (e.g. Deep Brain Stimulation) or are thought of as
having irreversible transformative effects (e.g. brain
chips), there is an increasing interest (among early
adopters, at least) in neuro ‘toys’: ostensibly harmless
contrivances that consumers may use for relatively sim-
ple goals, such as paying attention, relaxation (as an
alternative to alcohol, soft drugs or smoking), falling
asleep, improving one’s gaming skills or learning to
play a musical instrument faster.
1 This idea to think about technologies as parasites was inspired by
J.A. Miller in his text on Intimity (2008), in which he writes:
BExtimacy says that the intimate is Other-like a foreign body, a
parasite.^ http://www.lacan.com/symptom/?p=36
2 http://www.nerri.eu/eng/home.aspx
3 Ciência Viva, Portugal; London School of Economics and Polit-
ical Science, United Kingdom; Radboud University Nijmegen, the
Netherlands; Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria; Scuola
Internazionale Superiore di Studi Avanzati, Italy; Instituto de
Biologia Molecular e Celular, Portugal; Experimentarium, Den-
mark; Tilburg Law School, the Netherlands; Central European
University, Hungary; Universität Stuttgart, Germany; Johannes
Gutenberg Universität Mainz, Germany; Johannes Kepler
Universität, Austria; Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain; Toscana
Life Sciences, Italy; University of Iceland, Iceland; Genetic Alli-
ance, United Kingdom; European Brain Council, Belgium;King’s
College London, United Kingdom.
4 For this paper we analysed all general reports (see: http://www.
nerri.eu/eng/mutual-learning-exercises.aspx), and the notes and
transcripts of those events we had access to because we were
(directly or indirectly) involved in the organization (MLE 1,3,38
,39,44,50,55) or that weremade available on the internet (MLE 12,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eioy_sIICiU)
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Neurofeedback is a good example of what we would
consider a ‘soft’ technology. This brain computer inter-
face pretends to provide users access to the activity of
their ‘brainwaves’, so that they can try to change (for
example speed up or slow down) this neural activity. In
the context of therapy, neurofeedback is promoted to
treat various psychiatric afflictions, from ADHD up to
depression, but also physical problems (e.g. motor or
bowel problems) and stress-related symptoms (sleeping
problems, burn-out), but it is also employed to reach
peak performances (boosting concentration or creativi-
ty). As a toy it is manufactured in the context of games
such as Mindball, in which players influence the move-
ment of a ball across a table with the help of brainwaves,
but it also shows up in the context of computer games
where it promises to afford users more control over
concentration or relaxation. Neurofeedback is widely
accepted as a safe tool. Although there is much discus-
sion about its presumed positive effects (such as its
therapeutic effect in case of depressions etc.), the side-
effects are generally considered to be relatively harmless
[e.g. 40–42].
Another technology that is increasingly used as a
form of soft enhancement is transcranial direct current
stimulation. A tDCS device consists of two electrodes, a
low voltage battery and a resistor, which can be used to
send very low electric currents to the brain in order to
stimulate or inhibit neural activity. tDCS is used as a
therapy (for treating ADHD etc.) but also as form of
self-optimisation: as a thinking cap to concentrate, or to
increase creativity, or as a focus headset to improve
gaming performance. In comparison to neurofeedback,
however, the general consensus is that in principle there
are no serious side-effects, besides skin-irritation or
dizziness, but there are warnings that harmful side-
effects may occur when the tDCS headset is used inap-
propriately – for example by mixing up the electrodes or
attaching them at the wrong place [43, 44, ].
Technologies such as EEG and tDCS have been
discussed on various occasions during NERRI events.
Although they were sometimes considered as radical
self-transformative and risky, others rather talked or
fantasized about these tools as entertaining, caring or
life-style gadgets. As indicated, our aim is to distinguish
hard (invasive, transformative) from soft (non-invasive,
non-transformative) technologies focussing on the latter,
but realising that the boundary will be a fluid rather than
a rigid one. Nonetheless, our hypothesis is that these
relatively new gadgets emerging on the soft side of the
distinction will allow us to add relevance and realism to
the on-going (academic and public) enhancement
debate.
During a workshop on the ethical aspects of tDCS
applications,5 for instance, participants invented various
purposes they would like to use this technology for.
They for example fantasized about the possibility to
improve their Bself-development^. Someone imagined
a very small tDCS device that you can ‘stick under your
hair, so that nobody notices it, and you can dance all
night at a party’. Another participant compared neuro-
enhancement with positive psychology, and suggested
that we can help children to perform better at school.
And yet another participant expressed his desire (his
‘authentic wish’) to learn to play tennis, and that he
would like to have a tool that stimulates the learning
curve (via brainwaves for instance) to make his wish
come true. Other envisioned possibilities were tools to
play better mastermind or to make you feel high. Such
enabling devices – as they are sometimes called – tend
to be seen as relatively innocent and harmless.
In a workshop on the ethical implications of EEG
techniques,6 the possibility to enhance performances
with neurofeedback was discussed. One participant for
example mentioned that in several sports, professionals
already experiment with this. Helping children with a
neurofeedback training to improve concentration was
also mentioned, and seen as valuable. Another partici-
pant talked about a mobile EEG-device in a backpack –
that could monitor brain activity while someone is
walking around, which allegedly is in the making to
help professional athletes perform better.
We see these examples of soft enhancement as a
relatively new form of enhancement which not only
seems more realistic compared to some of the thought
experiments discussed in the literature, but that may also
allow us to open-up the entrenched – and in our opinion
somewhat dramatized – debate on transhumanism ver-
sus bioconservatism. Soft enhancement technologies are
not so much tools to upgrade the brain, but rather toys
(gadgets) one can experiment with. Neuro-toys are used
to enhance certain skills pertaining to gaming, relaxing,
sleeping or paying attention – they are gadgets that
allow us to take care of ourselves, or to entertain
5 MLE 39 see http://www.nerri.eu/eng/mutual-learning-
exercises/mle-39-world-cafe-enschede-tdcs.aspx
6 MLE 38 see http://www.nerri.eu/eng/mutual-learning-
exercises/mle-38-world-caf%C3%A9-enschede-eeg.aspx
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ourselves. Many of these headsets, apps, watches and
other devices are worn close to the body. They can be
used for daily practices, such as doing home-work, day-
dreaming or meditation.
Extimate Technologies
With ‘soft’ enhancement technologies, a new type
of technological artefacts is entering our lifeworld:
small, flexible and easily wearable. These devices
are tiny, smooth and subtle, and yet so demanding
that they constantly expect us to pay attention.
They fit smoothly and imperceptibly into our ev-
eryday environments, but precisely because of this
smoothness, they may be experienced as pervasive
or even uncanny. In other words, they are both
intimate and artificial, both alien and familiar, both
friendly and intrusive. Therefore, rather than ad-
dressing them as Bintimate^ technologies [45], we
will refer to them as Bextimate^ technologies,
building on a concept coined by Lacan [34, 46].
And as indicated, rather than as tools (a term
which may suggest hard enhancement), we prefer
to refer to them as gadgets or even toys.
These extimate neuro-toys are literally close to us –
in our pockets, on our heads, or on our skin. But they are
also close to us in another sense. These gadgets promise
to allow us to manage our inner self as it were: our
moods, our level of concentration, our sleep, our well-
being. They offer new ways to socialize or to express
ourselves. They are intimate insofar as they are close to
our bodies and relate to our intimate feelings or relation-
ships, but at the same time they intrude upon and inter-
fere with this very intimacy. They promise to allow us to
becomemanagers of our own health and happiness – but
at the same they may oblige us to move in certain
directions or to think about ourselves and our responsi-
bilities in a certain way.
This ostensibly contradictory effect of technology –
liberating and constraining at the same time – runs as an
important thread through the work of Michel Foucault.
In his introduction to The Use of Pleasure [47], Foucault
explains that his work revolves around three axes of
analysis: Knowledge, Power and the Self. In the
1960s, Foucault’s research focussed on (the archaeology
of) knowledge, in the 1970s on (the genealogy of)
power and in the 1980s on the (ethics of the) self, but
in his introduction to The Use of Pleasure [47] he
emphasises that these three dimensions belong together.
In other words, when it comes to assessing extimate
gadgets from a critical perspective, three types of ques-
tions must be asked: what new forms of knowledge are
involved? To which practices of power do they give
rise? And finally, which practices of the self are opened
up and facilitated by them? In others words, the question
is not whether these gadgets are either technologies of
subjection and control or technologies of freedom and
emancipation, for the most likely scenario is that they
are both. They open up new practices of the self, but at
the same time and because of this they may promote
new forms of panoptic surveillance and adaptation,
confronting us with societal expectations and standards
of normalcy [cf. 48].
In accordance with these three axes of enquiry
one could argue first of all that soft enhancement
gadgets represent new forms of knowledge, con-
densed into and represented by high-tech gadgets.
This new form of techno-knowledge, however
works in two directions. On the one hand it pro-
duces enabling devices, allowing individuals to
develop and experiment with new practices of the
self, exploring new identities, new forms of sub-
jectivity and self-management, closely monitoring
psychic and physical parameters. At the same time,
these gadgets are technologies of surveillance or
control: they keep track of our doings, assess our
performance, and literally speak out to us, via
messages of various kinds, articulating the imper-
ative that we must change our life in order to live
up to societal expectation in terms of health con-
dition, productivity, sociability and level of enjoy-
ment. For indeed: the most pervasive injunction of
postmodern neoliberal societies is the injunction to
liberate ourselves and to enjoy life to the full; to
be happy, productive, innovative, communicative
and creative. In other words, although these gad-
gets come very close, are compatible with an
elegant life-style and enter our life-world very
smoothly, they may nonetheless be quite intrusive,
but in a smooth and subtle way.
Foucault’s contemporary Jacques Lacan likewise ex-
plored the profound entanglements of truth, power and
the embodied self. Rather than seeing human desire as a
rebellious, primitive, natural energy, welling up from
below, but thwarted and repressed by power, desire is
produced by power. Indeed, Lacan stresses the pervasive
effects of truth and power on human embodiment, on
our Bflesh^ [49, p. 405]. Moreover, contemporary
From ‘Hard’ Neuro-Tools to ‘Soft’ Neuro-Toys?
society actually takes great pains to allow us to thrive
and enjoy.7 From a Lacanian perspective, the key in-
junction, coming from the superego, from the powerful
Other is: ‘Enjoy!’ [51, p. 320, 52, p. 191; cf. 46]. Seen
from this perspective, gadgets actually play a crucial
role in the current truth-power-desire constellation,
opening up new pathways of desire.
In 1969, for instance, before a crowd of Maoist
students, he discussed the famous Quotations from
Chairman Mao Zedong (the ‘little red book’). Rather
than being economically exploited by capitalism, Lacan
argued, the working-classes are bereft of a particular
type of dexterity or know-how connected with operating
big machines, but this type of work is becoming increas-
ingly automated and redundant. Therefore, it struck
Lacan that Mao’s booklet still purported to be a ‘manu-
al’ (instructing readers how to manually operate ma-
chines). This, he argued, seems outdated. A new type
of devices is emerging: very small, functioning smooth-
ly and completely forged by science, known as
Bgadgets^ [53, p. 174]. As an example, Lacan referred
to a tiny recording device someone in the audience was
actually using to record his speech. As big machines are
increasingly being replaced by, or operated with the help
of electronic devices (not handled with our hands, but
touched by fingertips), traditional industrial know-how
is quickly becoming obsolete, while ‘manuals’ inevita-
bly lose their effective potential. It is via these smooth,
opaque devices that the voice of power (Φ) now speaks
to us. Or as Lacan phrases it three years later (in Seminar
XX): science produced a new wave of miniature
Bgadgets^ [54, p. 104] and we have become (in a more
radical sense than we are usually aware of) the
subjects of these contrivances, which determine the
elementary structures of contemporary existence.
They connect us with new networks of truth,
representing the insatiable desire of the Big Other to
acquire more data about human subjects. Go on,
continue to produce more data! Never Enough! That
is the basic imperative of the new truth-power regime
[53, p. 120–121].
Via these gadgets, the gaze of the Other has become
distributed and omnipresent, allowing the ‘panoptic
Other’ (Foucault), the Lacanian ‘Big Other’ (Lacan),
to monitor and survey us, notably while engaged in
our most intimate and personalised practices of freedom.
By using gadgets, individuals spread clouds of electron-
ic emissions as they move about, feeding the panoptic
Other of the terabyte era, who then feeds this informa-
tion back to them in the form of norms and expectations,
highlighting the extent to which they divert from them
[48]. It is via these (allegedly hyper-individual) gadgets
that the voice of power speaks to us. These gadgets
prompt, inform, reprimand and re-educate us. And it is
from this perspective that we will analyse the three case
studies, presented in the next three sections.
Case Study 1: Necomimi
Show the world what’s really on your mind and
impress your friends with some of the most ad-
vanced brainwave technology available!
Necomimi’s cat-like reactive movements show
how interested or relaxed you are in real-time.
It’s a fun, quirky addition to parties, cosplay,
bachelorette weekends and tailgating at your fa-
vorite sporting event. Anytime you want to enter-
tain your friends and family, wear Necomimi!8
Necomimi is a set of cat-ears that users can put on
their head. They are connected to an EEG device that
measures their attention state. The ear movements re-
flect their brainwave state. When someone is relaxed,
focussed, or something in between, this is reflected by
the position of the ears - down, up, or wiggling. As a
result, users are promised to become Bthe centre of
attention everywhere you go! People can’t help but
watch in fascination as your Necomimi ears move in
real-time according to your state of mind.^ In commer-
cials, the ears are promoted as a way to express yourself,
and to interact with friends. In other words, although
Necomimi clearly is a toy, it is also promoted as a
socialising tool.
In first instance, Necomimi may seem a joke; some-
thing for fun. However, as soon as we start to think it
through, and take considerations of participants attend-
ing the NERRI workshop on EEG brain-computer in-
terfaces into account, there proves to be more to it than7 When asked whether (contrary to traditional psychoanalytic
views, criticized by him) Lacan’s work represented a view much
closer to his own, Foucault replied: BNo comment, as politicians
say when presented with a question which embarrasses them^ [50,
p. 666].
8 See: http://www.necomimi.com/ [accessed December 2015].
This case was presented during MLE 38, see http://www.nerri.
eu/eng/mutual-learning-exercises.aspx)
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entertainment only. One of the participants for example
wondered: Bcan you imagine that you are in the train and
all people are wearing such a thing?^ Someone else
said: B[think about] job interviews with EEG. When
you are too tense, you won’t get the job because you
will be susceptible for burn-out.^ Also, someone imag-
ined: BWhat if your boss decides: Bfrom now on, wewill
measure your brain activity from 9 to 5; this may make
you hesitate on Sunday evening: shall I drink this glass
of wine, or will this be noticeable in the morning?^
What would be the impact of a simple toy like
Necomimi if it would really become a hit? How would
it affect relationships between people, between strangers
on a train, for instance, or between managers and em-
ployees at work?
Imagine a train full of people wearing cat ears. What
would it mean when an unknown person sitting in front
of you keeps wiggling his or her cat ears while staring at
you?Or howwould it feel if you had a nice conversation
with a particular person with cat ears showing interest,
but during the chat the ears suddenly go down, suggest-
ing that he or she is bored? Would it add something to
‘naturally occurring’ forms of nonverbal communica-
tion? Or imagine having a job interview while wearing
cat ears – what would the interviewer think when your
ears suddenly slide into the relaxation phase? And how
would it be when everyone in the office wears cat ears,
and you notice that the ears of your colleagues are
continuously alert, while your own ears keep on wig-
gling? That is to say, even innocent ‘toys’ like
Necomimi cat ears may have awkward effects.
Assessing Necomimi in terms of the truth-power-
embodied self constellation building on Lacan and Fou-
cault, as outlined above, these uncanny effects should be
taken quite seriously. Such gadgets reflect our mood and
level of attention. On the one hand they are intimate
devices, worn on our bodies, reflecting our emotions,
facilitating social interaction, but at the same time they
remain something foreign which may easily slip out of
our control. It becomes an additional source of informa-
tion for others (such as colleagues or managers),
allowing them to assess our effort and performance.
They open us up to the gaze of the Other, who is enabled
to monitor and judge us. With a very simple gadget, a
new type of knowledge, namely brainwave knowledge,
is distributed, communicated and interpreted. Necomimi
is a social tool, used to amuse friends or colleagues, but
to the extent that this gadget becomes embedded and
normalised, these friends and colleagues may
increasingly expect our brainwaves to live up to the
‘brainwave norm’. Eventually, perhaps, we all will be
expected to wiggle too. Indeed, why not? In other
words, although Necomimi originates as a self-practice,
a form of carefree experimentation, it may actually
evolve into a technology of control, giving rise to prac-
tices of power, confronting us with new societal expec-
tations and new standards of normalcy. What is so
interesting about Necomimi, we would argue, is not
the playful device as such, but rather the fact that it
represents an emerging generation of communicative
technologies bent on making our mood and emotional
states more transparent to others, while we ourselves
will no longer be totally dependent on verbal and non-
verbal communication only when it comes to assessing
the state of mind of others. In other words, Necomimi
may simply be the first of a new type of communicative
gadgets which may enter our daily, social and profes-
sional lives.
Case Study 2: Thync
Thync, how good feels
When you have the power to change the way you
feel, it changes everything.
Wear Thync for minutes, feel the effects for hours.
I felt lazy - Now I’m motivated
I felt stressed - Now I’m calm
I felt scattered - Now I’m focused
I felt restless - Now I’m asleep9
Thync is a small device, consisting of three compo-
nents: a strip that connects the right side of your fore-
head with a spot at the upper side of your neck (to calm
down) or at the back of your right ear (to stimulate); a
white piece of plastic (a sort of plaster) to put on the strip
at your forehead; and an app on your phone with which
you can tune the vibes it produces. It combines the
technology of tDCS (transcranial direct current stimula-
tion) with TENS (Transcutaneous electrical nerve stim-
ulation) and claims to evoke stimulating or calming
vibes. On the Thync website, the device is promoted
for purposes such as ‘Get better sleep’, ‘Improve fitness,
train harder and recover faster’, ‘Unwind after a stressful
9 See http://www.thync.com/archive/home, accessed in November
2015
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day’, ‘Get focused and more productive’, or ‘Be more
mindful or centred’.10
Thync is a life-style tool. Pictures on the internet
show people who are hanging out on the couch or lying
in bed, doing sport or yoga or working in the office,
having a party or chilling out with friends. It is a new
tool (released in June 2015), and the idea is that people
can stimulate or calm down with a simple app on their
smart phone. Thync is promoted as safe and simple, as is
emphasised for example in this text of a press release:
At Home, Work or School, Vibes Enhance Daily
Life
Thync Vibes help you smoothly and quickly tran-
sition from one mental state to another with com-
fort and ease. Thync users have described the
chemical-free effects to be similar to a Bshot of
an espresso^ or a Bglass of wine^. The immediate
effects can last from 30 minutes to an hour, with
the carry-over impacts lasting several hours.11
All this sounds great: Feeling the effects of an espres-
so or winewhenever you want without experiencing any
toxic side-effects. However, controlling your mood with
your mobile phone may also be an awkward experience
and in the long run it might even fan the flames of the
bio-conservative vs. transhumanism debate since it
seems to represent the first step towards a process of
gradual self-robotisation: (wo) men being increasingly
steered by a computer, tuning themselves ‘on’ in the
morning and ‘off’ in the evening. Moreover, one may
wonder how desirable it really is to be able to adjust
one’s mental state. Reducing stress with an app, for
example, might make people more resilient in the short
term, but perhaps result in burn-out in the longer run.
Moreover, besides as a Foucauldian ‘technology of
the self’ [55], Thync may also operate as a technology
of surveillance and control. Thync will connect our daily
lives with electronic networks. Besides producing
knowledge about ourselves (potentially useful in the
context of various practices of the self, being enabled
to modify our level of activity), others may eventually
expect us to relax or concentrate on demand, with the
help of a simple smart phone app. Furthermore, such
devices may feed the insatiable need of commercial
health care companies and governmental agencies for
data. They may contribute to the big digital data explo-
sion that is already ongoing, concerning individuals and
populations and their preferences, daily routines and
social behaviours. That is, the kind of information gath-
ered with the help of simple apps like Thync may feed
various ‘Big Others’, who in the end will translate the
data collected from consumers into nudging normative
expectations. In short, for us, the debate concerning
‘soft’ enhancement gadgets such as Thync should not
primarily focus on the question whether there will be
any immediate neurological side-effects, risks, or even
long-term damage (although this question is highly rel-
evant of course), but should rather focus on the social or
cultural impacts, i.e. the ways in which such devices
may affect social interactions and expectations: effects
which are sometimes referred to as ‘soft’ impacts of
technology [56].
Case Study 3: Alpha-Stim
When I am anxious
When I can’t sleep
When I am depressed
When I am in pain
I Alpha-Stim
Let nothing stop you
In contrast to Necomimi and Thync, Alpha-Stim was
originally developed as a therapeutic device. It is a CES
(cranial electrotherapy stimulation) device and already
exists for more than 20 years. The Alpha-Stim consists
of a stimulator and two clips you can put on your
earlobes (or electrodes you can put on any other part
of your body). To relieve anxiety, depression or sleeping
disorders, you may stimulate your brain by sending an
electric current from one earlobe to the other. In contrast
to psychotherapy, this small electronic device is as-
sumed to work quickly (in the case of depression im-
provements are expected to set in after 1–3 weeks), or
even to give an immediate effect (a reduction in
anxiety).
Alpha-Stim is easy to use. It is promoted as a
device you can use anywhere and anytime:
10 The THYNC device is tested, but only by its own developers.
The FDA considered the THYNC system as a life style product
and hence not ‘subject to medical device regulations requiring pre-
market clearance or approval’ . (http://support.thync.
com/articles/FAQ/H08)
11 http://www.thync.com/resources/press-release/thync-launches-
first-wearable-to-shift-your-state-of-mind
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Alpha-Stim treatments do not require spending
time away from your daily routine. You can use
it while you do paperwork, computer work,
watching TV or reading the newspaper. (…) You
can even stick the device into your pocket and use
it while you take a walk, or even during chores.12
It is a form of soft enhancement in the sense that it is
promoted as safe and easy to use. It is not literally a toy
to use for fun, but a relatively simple device to reduce
stress, anxiety and depression or to improve sleep. In
other words, who would not want an Alpha-Stim to
boost their mood at certain moments? Or, as it was
expressed by one of the EEG workshop participants:
BHow about feeling tense or anxious? If you could learn
to influence your brainwaves – if I could train myself in
such a way that I would never be afraid anymore… that
would be cool!^ However, another participant immedi-
ately formulated an objection in response: BWell, people
who don’t feel fear enough: they are the psychopaths.^
That is to say, even with a device that promises to
reduce anxieties and depressing feelings, there might be
uncanny elements involved. No one wants to be a psy-
chopath, and this reminder illustrates that our fears or
moments of depression may also have a function. Just
zapping these restraining feelings away with a mere
click on a button (so to speak) might also ignore the
reasons why someone experiences fear or feels a bit
down. From this perspective, the advertisement slogan
BLet nothing stop you^ suddenly sounds less good. If
we are no longer troubled by our fears, our feelings of
stress, by depressive thoughts or sleepless nights, some-
thing may be lost as well. When there is no longer any
reason to stop, when people are always eager to keep
going, we may well be worse off than we are now.
In terms of ‘soft’ impacts of ‘soft technologies’ one
could argue that, although private use of technologies
such as Alpha-Stim for private purposes may seem
fairly innocent, they may nonetheless change the way
in which we see and think about ourselves. In other
words, using Alpha-Stim as a technology of the self
may prompt us to rethink our emotional states in terms
of brainwave problems [cf. 57]. Fears and inhibitions
are reframed as phenomena occurring inside your head,
for otherwise it would make no sense to work on your
brainwaves. That is, devices such as Alpha-Stim may
give rise to neuro-centric understandings of the self. By
reducing the ungraspable self to a knowable and
refurbishable brain, various options for intra- or inter-
personal manipulation are opened up.
Technologies as Parasites
All three devices discussed, Necomimi, Thync and Al-
pha-Stim, are extimate devices. They are in-timate in the
sense that they are wearable close to our body, but also
because they allegedly allow us to express or modify
inner emotional states. At the same time, they are intru-
sive and artificial, notably because these technologies
may have impacts in the longer run which we initially
may not be aware of. The intimacy of Necomimi is
obvious – the cat ears say something about you which
may otherwise not be shared. It reveals something of
what goes on at the inside, on the level of your personal
feelings. It makes something public which usually re-
mains intimate. But precisely because of this externali-
sation of the inner self, there also is a loss of control.
Users may become an easier target for manipulative
strategies of others. Thync and Alpha-Stim add some-
thing to this in the sense that users not only reveal but
also may try to influence and control their intimate
feelings. But again, this externalisation may eventually
imply that others adapt their expectations. That is, all
technologies are ‘extimate’ in the sense that they cause
part of one’s intimacy (one’s inner state) to become
externalised and manipulable.
Necomimi is a social tool in the sense that it is
designed to share one’s inner states with others. It is a
communicative tool. The wiggling ears literally say
something about the user. Thync and Alpha-Stim, on
the other hand, allow individuals to adapt to a particular
situation. They are adaptive tools, designed for use in
daily situations, by individuals who are relating to others
(in the office, during yoga class or at a party). The desire
to be able to modify one’s inner state indicates that,
apparently, we are not always happy with the normal
situation. We want to be more in control and to employ
soft devices for their mood activating or calming effect.
Still, as in the case of Necomini, users give something
away about themselves so that they may indicate uncer-
tainties and inhibitions to others (colleagues, managers,
partners, etc.).
Moreover, to the extent that the use of devices such as
Thync and Alpha-Stim becomes more normalised and
less exceptional, even the opposite effect may occur in
the sense that others begin to wonder why we do not use12 https://www.jamesgfriesen.com/alpha-stim.php
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such device more frequently, so that our moods and
inner states become more predictable and manageable.
And to the extent that devices such as Alpha-Stim
indeed help us to reduce anxieties or depressions easily,
we may be criticised for not using it more often when-
ever our moods or emotions are contrary to what is
expected of us. That is, Necomimi, Thync and Alpha-
Stim may seem friendly and intimate at first sight, but in
the longer run the liberty and autonomy of users may
rather decrease than increase.
In other words, these ‘intimate’ devices also involve
externalisation, giving other people access to our inti-
mate feelings and desires. And not only particular others
(colleagues, managers, teachers, partners), but also the
generalised Other, the big panoptic Other, whomay now
monitor and criticise our performance more intensely
than before. These tools may introduce new standards of
normalcy, new social expectations. Moreover, we may
even gradually become more and more dependent on
them. Initially, we may use them for entertainment, or to
become more sociable and relaxed, but gradually they
will force us to improve our social and professional
performance. They may become a kind of externalised
super-ego, telling us that we can still do better. Increas-
ingly, we will become dependent on these devices to
manage our anxieties and inhibitions.
Extimate technologies are small and smooth and may
become easily embedded in our daily lives, but also in
our bodies. For although devices such as Alpha-Stim,
Thync and Necomimi are not really implanted, they do
monitor our inner states and in that sense they become
an extended, externalised part of our brains, measuring
brain activity and exposing our brain to external influ-
ences. Moreover, instead of merely serving us and help-
ing us, these tools may increasingly become objects of
daily concern, and as such they may become increas-
ingly demanding: they monitor us and speak to us [35].
They reveal our deficiencies and short-comings, to our-
selves, but also to others.
We could think of extimate technologies as devices
which open up intimacy to others while inviting other-
ness into our intimate existence. Thus, extimate tech-
nologies may function as technological parasites. We
use Thync, Alpha-Stim or Necomimi because we want
something: to relax, to feel better, or to improve our
social relationships, but before long, the gadget itself
becomes the object we are longing for. And instead of
solving problems, the gadgets may introduce new con-
cerns into our lives. For instance, because it does not
function the way we had hoped it would, or because it
works too well: revealing things about ourselves we
rather do not want to be informed about, or sharing
information about our inner states with others which
we do not really want to share. We are increasingly
serving the gadgets that were supposed to be serving us.
Extimate technologies are enabling devices. They are
designed to make life easier, but at the same time they
spur us to change and improve our style of living,
subjecting us to an increased self-awareness via process-
es of self-surveillance. Thus, technologies of the self
may easily evolve into technologies of control, subject-
ing us to the panoptic Other. Or, rather, these devices
always involve both dimensions: they are technologies
of the self and technology of control at the same time. It
is precisely because we can use these technologies to
take better care of ourselves that, in the long run, we
may be expected or even forced to do so. That is, these
extimate technologies are both embedded and intrusive;
both user-friendly and uncanny.
Conclusion
The materials produced by the NERRI project reveal
that in actual European debates on neuro-enhancement,
‘soft’ enhancement – in the form of neuro-toys or gad-
gets – may become a focus of attention. In current
academic discourse, however, these ‘soft’ devices are
underrepresented. By focussing on soft enhancement,
the enhancement debate may enter a new stage,
bypassing the current tendencies towards either
trivialisation or over-dramatization. Instead of asking
whether certain types of pills have an effect similar to
coffee or whether neuro-tools are transforming humans
into cyborgs, ‘soft’ gadgets provide a more interesting
target for deliberation. Whenever these technologies are
recommended as instances of self-help, or as items that
can be used for fun, some of the more questionable
aspects seem to be easily overlooked. Something more
is involved than mere entertainment or relaxation and
this article aimed to articulate this ‘more’.
Soft enhancement technologies are basically gadgets
individuals may want to use to express themselves or to
take care of themselves. But this objective – expressing
and sharing one’s inner feelings or changing one’s inner
state – may also subject users to surveillance or even
manipulation by others. And although this surveillance
or manipulation argument might seem to fit the agenda
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of bio-conservatives, we hope to have made clear that
we are not referring to dystopian scenarios of thought
police or oppression, but to a more subtle form of power
as indicated by Foucault and Lacan. These technologies
are designed to enhance our lives, but can also become
an issue of concern. These gadgets are extimate rather
than intimate because their intimacy exposes us to the
gaze of others. They are both intimate and intrusive,
both familiar and uncanny. We could even think of these
neuro-toys as technological parasites: using us to func-
tion and proliferate.
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